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TheBehavior of Residential Mortgage
Yields Since 1951 Jack M. Guttentag
This chapter reports some selected findings drawn from a study of the
behavior of residential mortgage interest rates in the period since
1951. The findings reported here are based in part on new monthly
and quarterly time series on residential mortgage rates and terms
drawn from the internal records of some large life insurance com-
panies.' These new data have a combination of important attributes
heretofore not available in any single series.
First, the date of record is the date when loans were committed or
authorized by lenders, rather than the date on which funds were dis-
bursed. Hence the long and erratic lag characteristic of a series
recorded on a disbursement basis is largely eliminated.
Second, the data cover all three types of residential mortgages
(FHA, VA, and conventional); separate series are also available on
mortgages acquired through correspondents as opposed to those
originated directly by life insurance companies.
Third, the data include loan-value ratios and maturities, as well as
fees and charges collected and paid by the lender over and above the
contract rate. The contract rate, adjusted to take account of net fees
NOTE: This is a revised draft of a paper presented at a joint meeting of the American
Real Estate and Urban Economics Association and the American Finance Association
in San Francisco, California, on December 27, 1966. I am indebted to Phillip Cagan,
Avery Cohan, and Richard Selden for helpful comments.
The larger study upon which this paper is based, prepared in collaboration with
Morris Beck, "New Series on Residential Mortgage Yields Since 1951," will provide a
more detailed discussion of the technical features and analytical characteristics of these
data, along with the series themselves.30 Essays on interest Rates
and charges received by the lender, is referred to as "effective yield"
or simply "yield." 2
Fourth,the data have a broad geographic base, since the lenders
covered by the series operate nationwide.
These new series are supplemented by data on FHA mortgages
provided by that agency, and on FHA and VA mortgages provided by
the Federal National Mortgage Association. These are sometimes
referred to as "secondary market" series, since they are based on
transactions covering more or less completed mortgages for "im-
mediate delivery";in contrast, the National Bureau series is based
on a commitment, which implies delivery of the mortgage sometime
in the future. I have also used new series on conventional mortgages
compiled by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board beginning in Decem-
ber
The paper is divided into six sections. Following the summary,
there are three sections on the relationship between mortgage yields
and bond yields, and two sections on relationships between FHA, VA,
and conventional mortgage yields.
Summary and Conclusions
The new commitment data show that for the period prior to 1961 con-
ventional mortgage yields had a narrower cyclical amplitude than high
grade bond yields. The new data thus confirm the findings of earlier
investigators, but they do not support the various hypotheses advanced
2Theeffective yield is determined by the following factors: contract rate, fees and
charges expressed as a per cent of the loan amount, face maturity, method of repayment
(most home mortgages are on uniform monthly payment basis), and actual life (most
mortgages are prepaid in full prior to maturity). The Mortgage Yield Table published by
the Boston Financial Publishing Company shows the yield on uniform monthly payment
mortgages for various combinations of these variables. Except where indicated other-
wise, all effective yields referred to in this paper are based on the assumption of uniform
monthly payments and prepayment in full after ten years.
FHA series are based on opinions of FHA insuring office directors regarding
the prices prevailing in their areas. The FNMA quotations are based on sales reported
by mortgage companies, mainly to life insurance companies and mutual savings banks,
and may include commitments as well as over-the-counter purchases. FNMA quota-
tions are said to be adjusted to a common service fee.
These series are based on the date of the approval of a borrower's loan application,
which is the same as the date of authorization, except in cases where commitments are
given to builders. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board series used in this paper cover
direct loans by life insurance companies secured by newly built homes.Residential Mortgage Yields Since 1951 31
by them to explain this phenomenon. The relatively narrow cyclical
amplitude of mortgage yields, at least on loans by life insurance com-
panies, is not due to failure to allow for cyclical changes in fees and
charges. Nor does the evidence suggest that cyclical yield variability
is dampened by variability in loan-value ratios and maturities, in
borrower characteristics affecting risk, or in the composition of loan
aggregates by region or by individual lender. The hypothesis that
relatively high origination costs dampen mortgage yield variability is
another one which does not withstand close scrutiny. Cyclical changes
in risk premiums could play a role in dampening mortgage yield ampli-
tude relative to that of bonds, but most of the available evidence
suggests otherwise.
The hypothesis suggested here is that the narrow cyclical amplitude
of mortgage yields relative to bond yields reflects differences in market
organization. Yields tend to be less volatile in negotiated markets
where the borrower and the lender are in direct contact, than in dealer-
type markets. Some of the reasons for this also underlie the tendency
for mortgage yields to lag bond yields at cyclical turning points.
The new authorizations data confirm that mortgage yields tend to lag
behind bond yields at cyclical turning points. This is not explained by
the hypothesis that small changes in mortgage market conditions
register first in such nonrate dimensions of mortgage loans as loan-
value ratios, maturities or fees and charges. The evidence indicates
that these characteristics may be even less sensitive than the contract
rate. The hypothesis suggested to explain the lag in mortgage yields
is that the basic demand for mortgage credit is relatively stable and
that short-run developments affecting general yield levels ordinarily
originate in the bond markets. The transmission of bond yield changes
to the mortgage market is entirely dependent on the activities of the
primary lenders (there is no dealer arbitrage). Since these lenders
respond only to what they consider pervasive movements in bond
yields, which must prove out over time, the transmission process
takes time and mortgage yields lag. The transmission lag may account
in part for the smaller cyclical amplitude of mortgage yields than of
bond yields, since the lag prevents the full range of bond yield changes
from being transmitted to the mortgage market.
The 1961—66 behavior of mortgage yields, however, represents a
sharp break with past patterns. During the long stretch of easy money
extending from 1961 to 1965, mortgage yields continued to decline
far beyond the lower turning point of bond yields. Then as tight money
emerged in 1966, mortgage yields rose with unprecedented rapidity.32 Essays on interest Rates
In contrast to the prior three cycles, the amplitude of conventional
mortgage yields (measured in basis points) was comparable to that of
bonds in both phases of the 196 1—66 cycle.
Structural changes affecting the commercial banking system may
have been largely responsible for this. During 1961—66, commercial
banks underwent a marked shift in policy toward time deposits. With
their secondary reserves of government securities largely depleted,
time deposits became a valuable source of funds over which commer-
cial banks could exercise some degree of control. The importance of
time deposits in the bank liability which had been growing
steadily for some time, accelerated markedly. The higher deposit costs
and reduced liquidity requirements associated with time deposits
encouraged a portfolio shift into relatively high-yielding mortgages.
This shift put added downward pressure on mortgage yields during the
easy money period of 1961—65.
When tight money emerged in 1966 banks did not withdraw whole-
sale from the mortgage market as they had in earlier periods of
restraint; probably, because by then many banks considered mortgages
a permanent part of their portfolios. Under the same pressures to meet
business loan demands as in earlier periods of restraint, the banks
had no buffer of government securities to liquidate. As a result they
competed for time deposits with unprecedented aggressiveness and
considerable success, in good part, at the expense of savings institu-
tions which invest most of their funds in mortgages. Whereas govern-
ment securities liquidation in earlier periods had dispersed market
pressures rather widely, the withdrawal of funds from savings institu-
tions impinged directly on the mortgage market and resulted in an
unprecedented rise in mortgage yields.
There is some indication that the yield advantage of conventional
over FHA mortgages declined secularly over the period 1949—66.
Presumably the decline reflected favorable repayment experience over
the period, which would have reduced ex ante risk premiums on con-
ventional loans.
The conventional-FHA yield differential does not show any sys-
tematic cyclicalpattern. During two periods of extreme credit
stringency, in late 1959—60 and 1966, FHA mortgages came to yield
appreciably more than conventional ones, however. This appears to
be a real market phenomenon rather than a statistical accident; it
shows up in data covering individual lenders, and in data for individual
states —bothstates with low usury ceilings and states with high or no
ceilings. One explanation is that those mortgage lenders who preferResidential Mortgage Yields Since 1951 33
FHAs to conventionals are sensitive to yield differentials between
mortgages and bonds and shift out of mortgages when capital markets
become very tight. Mortgage lenders who prefer conventionals are
willing to absorb the overhang of FHAs only at premium rates.
At various times, FHA mortgages have carried a higher contract
rate than VAs, and this has affected their relative yield. Prior to mid-
1952, FHAs and VAs carried premiums. Under these conditions
FHAs, having a higher contract rate, carried higher yields. This
probably resulted from the risk aversion of conservative lenders to the
uncertainty associated with realized yield when mortgages sell above
par. (The yield realized on a mortgage that is not priced at par depends
not only on the contract rate and the size of the premium or discount,
but also on the life of the mortgage which is not known in advance.
Most mortgages are prepaid in full well before maturity.) When
mortgages carry premiums yield is an increasing function of mortgage
life and may be very low, even zero or negative, if the mortgage is
paid off soon after origination. An over-estimate of mortgage life can
thus have a seriously adverse effect on realized yield. If the market is
dominated by conservative lenders, concerned with the "worst that
can happen," the premium paid on a high contract rate mortgage will
not be large enough to provide a yield equal to that on a low contract
rate mortgage when yields are calculated on the basis of any reasonable
estimate of expected life.
During 1957-61 FHA contract rates were again higher than VAs,
but in this period both carried discounts. When mortgages carry dis-
counts, yield is a decreasing function of life and the lowest possible
yield, realized if the mortgage runs to maturity, is not much lower than
the yield based on its expected life. Hence, yield uncertainty asso-
ciated with uncertainty regarding mortgage life probably does not have
much influence on the relative yields of mortgages carrying different
contract rates.
Discounts raise public relations problems, however, particularly with
regard to larger lenders in the public eye such as the life insurance com-
panies covered by our interest rate study. These lenders, sensitive to
public censure, took discounts on VAs that were smaller than those
necessary to equalize the yield with the higher contract rate FHAs, but
they sharply reduced their VA volume. Hence, for these lenders FHAs
yielded more than VAs. Data provided by FNMA reveal, however,
that in the "free" market where discounts on VAs rose to the level
needed to clear the market, VAs yielded more than FHAs. it is ironical
that the public pressures on large institutions to limit discounts on VA34 Essays on Interest Rates
mortgages, by causing them to sharply reduce their VA volume, had
the effect of increasing pressure on VA discounts in the free market.
There are indications, however, that during 195 8—59 life insurance
company attitudes toward discounting began to change in that they be-
gan to accept the discounts required to bring VA yields into an ap-
propriate relationship to FHA yields. By 1961 the mortgage market
had evidently learned to live with discounts.
Cyclical Amplitude of Mortgage Yields and Bond Yields
In an earlier study, Klaman noted that conventional mortgage interest
rates have a smaller cyclical amplitude than bond yields.5 The same ob-
servation was made earlier by Grebler, Blank and Winnick.6 Although
Klaman's data were recorded on the disbursement date, which tends to
dampen amplitude,7 the observation also applies to mortgage yields
recorded on an authorization basis. As shown in Table 2-1, the change
in conventional mortgage yields (measured in basis points) in each of
six cyclical phases between 1949 and 1960 was smaller than the change
in yields on U.S. government bonds, outstanding corporate bonds (both
Aaa and Baa), and outstanding state and local bonds (both Aaa and
Baa). (In the most recent cycle, conventional mortgage yield amplitude
was comparable to that of bonds, but special factors were at work that
will be discussed later in this paper.) Cyclical changes expressed in
terms of percentage changes in yields would show even more marked
differences in amplitude because of the higher absolute level of
mortgage yields.
There are several possible explanations for the relatively narrow
cyclical amplitude of mortgage interest First, the data used by
earlier investigators did not take account of fees and charges received
or paid by lenders over and above the contract rate. Grebler, Blank
and Winnick noted that "since the data show contract interest rates
rather than yields on mortgages, they fail to reflect changes in pre-
miums and discounts on mortgage loans, at times important in the
Saul B. Kiaman, The Postwar Residential Mortgage Market, Princeton for NBER,
1961, pp. 75—78.
6LeoGrebler, David M. Blank and Louis Winnick, Capital Formation in Residential
Real Estate: Trends and Prospects, Princeton for NBER, 1956, P. 223.
Whenmortgage rates are recorded on the disbursement date the recorded peak and
trough values are actually averages of rates authorized during a number of months pre-
ceding the turning point month.Residential Mortgage Yields Since 1951 35








Con- aryGovt.Corporate & Local
yen- Mar-Long-
Period ofRise (R) tionalFHAketTermAaaBaaAaaBaa
or Decline (D) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1949—51D —10 —20 —28 —26 —27 —37 —63 —97
1951—53 R 56 62 85 94 83 72 134 168
1954D —15 —11 —33 —66 —53 —43 —74 —73
1954—58 R 97 104 110 126 125 164 153 155
1958D —31 —16 —31—61 —55 —56—74—78
1958—60 R 72 81 94 125 104 81 80 72
Average,3cycles 47 49 64 83 75 76 96 107
1960—65D —60 na —85—64 —42 —56—60—101
1965—66 R 105 na 156 106 130 140 104 106
Average, I cycle 83 na 121 85 86 98 82 104
SouRcE:Col. 1 and 2, data suppliedto NBER in a survey of life insurance companies
andto appear in a forthcoming publication, plus Federal Home Loan Bank Board; col. 3,
FHA; cot. 4, Federal Reserve System; cots. 5, 6, 7, 8, Moody's.
NOTE: Dates refer to years containing turning points in conventional mortgage series.
Cyclical changes are measured between peaks and troughs of each series. Averages are
calculated without regard to sign.
na =notavailable.
mortgage market."8 Furthermore, an a priori argument for cyclical
sensitivity in fees and charges is that local institutions would feel less
comfortable about raising rates than about raising fees and charges.
The going rates on mortgages in any given area are widely known,
while fees and charges are not.9
The new authorization series, which take account of fees and
charges, do not bear out this supposition. On conventional loans, the
inclusion of fees and charges has virtually no effect on cyclical ampli-
tude. This is illustrated in Chart 2-1 which shows effective yield, con-
tract rate, and the difference between them. (Note that the difference
8Grebler, Blank and Winnick, p. 223.
I owe this point to Avery Cohan.36 Essays on Interest Rates
CHART 2-I. Gross Yields and Contract Rate on Conventional Loans, 1951—
63
Per cent
is on an enlarged scale.) It is clear that virtually all cyclical variability
in conventional yields stems from variability in the contract rate.
Whether fees and charges are cyclically insensitive for lender groups
other than life insurance companies is not clear. Federal Home Loan
Bank Board data covering the period of marked rate increase, Sep-
tember—October 1965 to December 1966—January 1967, suggest that
cyclical changes in fees and charges may be significant for savings and
loan associations and, perhaps, commercial banks. During that period,
the average effective yield on new-home loans approved by savings and
loan associations rose by about 68 basis points, the increase in fees and
charges accounting for about 10 basis points and the increase in con-
tract rate for the balance. For commercial banks, the rise in fees ac-
Per centResidential Mortgage Yields Since 1951 37
counted for 5 basis points of a 76 point rise in yield. For the three other
lender groups —lifeinsurance companies, mortgage companies and
mutual savings banks —feesand charges did not rise significantly. This
evidence is hardly conclusive, however, since the data cover only one
cyclical phase; and the Board's definition of fees and charges is not
comprehensive.'0
The popular notion that small changes in market conditions are
better revealed in fees and charges on conventional loans than in con-
tract rates, seems to derive from the fact that fees and charges are
infinitely divisible while lenders very seldom write loans at contract
rates that are not multiples of +percent. Indivisibility does not, how-
ever, imply inflexibility in an aggregate, i.e., an average contract rate
can rise .01 per cent when a small proportion of the mortgages in the
aggregate, which previously had barely qualified for aper cent rate,
are jumped to 5* per cent, the others remaining unchanged.
A second possible explanation of the relatively narrow cyclical
amplitude of conventional mortgage yields was suggested by Kiaman.
the element of administrative costs ... hasits own place in the relative stick-
iness of mortgage rates. In general, the larger such costs are relative to the
interest rate the more stable the interest rate is likely to be. The reason is
simple: a minimum margin must be maintained between the interest rate and a
lender's fixed administrative costs to assure him a reasonable return ... On
residential loans, administrative costs of acquisition, servicing, and record-
keeping, perhaps 75 basis points compared to 10 on corporate securities,
create a relatively stable state in residential mortgage interest rates.'1
This reasoning is not convincing. Since mortgage rates at their lowest
levels are several times higher than mortgage costs, it is not clear just
how these costs dampen rate variability. Even if there is such a rate-
dampening mechanism, which is not yet understood, one would think
that the extent of the rate dampening effect would depend not on the
absolute cost but on its size relative to the average rate level on that
instrument. Viewed in this way it is not at all clear that costs would
have more of a dampening effect on mortgages than on bonds. The rate
differential between mortgages and bonds (Baa and higher) is almost
always greater than the 65 basis point cost differential mentioned by
Kiaman.
10Inthe Board's series, fees and charges cover only payments received by lenders,
excluding payments made by tenders to third parties as "finder's fees." In the Bureau
series, fees paid are netted from fees received. It is possible that fees paid by some
lenders are cyclically sensitive.
Kiaman, p. 78.38 Essays on interest Rates
A third explanation, also suggested by Kiaman, is that adjustments
in nonrate dimensions of the mortgage loan contract retard or offset
rate adjustments.
As we move away from standardized to more differentiated markets and com-
modities the number of variables, in addition to price, to be negotiated multi-
plies. The market for residential mortgages is an example of the most dil-
ferentiated because few markets are characterized by more one-of-a-kind
deals. The credit.of each borrower must be established, and 'credit worthiness'
becomes a function of the relative tightness of capital markets. Numerous con-
tract terms other than price are subject to individual negotiation —down-pay-
ment requirements, amortization provisions, contract maturities, prepayment
penalties and non-interest Costs. The nature and location of the particular
residential unit securing the mortgage, moreover, are important factors in a
mortgage transaction.
All these elements are more sensitive than the mortgage interest rate is to
changes in financial market conditions. Down-payment and maturity provi-
sions are particularly responsive.
This argument is illustrated in the upper panel of Figure 2-1. If the
aggregate yield series constitutes a weighted average of components
A(high yield) and B(low yield), and the mix shifts toward B when yields
rise and toward A when they fall, cyclical variability in the aggregate
will be dampened.
Examination of cyclical variability in the mix of available loan
characteristics helps to test this hypothesis. Table 2-2 shows that
cyclical variability was negligible for loan-value ratios and maturities
on conventional mortgages by life insurance companies during the
195 1—63 period. For example, during the 1954 period of declining
yields, the average maturity on conventional loans rose by sixteen
months and the loan-value ratio by only two-tenthsa percentage
point. Cross-section regression analysis (not shown here) suggests that
such increases would affect yields by less than .01 per cent.
Cyclical changes in borrower characteristics associated with risk
could affect cyclical yield variability. This appears to be the case in at
least one other negotiated loan market. It has been found that a larger
proportion of commercial bank business loans are to prime borrowers
at interest rate peaks than at troughs; and that this tends to dampen
variability in average business loan rates.13 There is no evidence of a
12ibid.,pp. 77 and 78.
Albert M. Wojnilower and Richard E. Speagle, "The Prime Rate," in Essays in
Money and Credit, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1964, pp. 50—5 1.Interest rate




FIGURE 2-1. Interest Rate Adjustments to Cyclical Change
similar tendency in the case of conventional mortgage loans by life
insurance companies, however. The only measure of borrower risk
available from the time series is the average property value underlying
the series.14 Trend-adjusted cyclical fluctuations in average property
14Ona cross-section basis property value appears to be a better measure of borrower
risk than current income, probably because property value is a better proxy for per-
manent income. When effective yield on conventional loans is regressed separately on
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TABLE 2-2.Changesin Maturities and Loan-Value Ratios During Periods of
Cyclical Rise and Decline in Mortgage Yields, 1953—63











9.10 .26 18.80 .48 11.60 .55
42.20 1.32 .40 .01 14.00 .78







Changes in Loan-Value Ratio (percentage points)
1.00 .03 2.00 .05 3.40 .16
2.60 .08 4.30 1.20 .60 .03




Part B: Periods of Decline in Yields
Per Per 1960— Per







Changes in Maturity (months)
16.10 1.61 11.90 1.49 30.10 .75
9.90 .66 22.50 3.75 8.50 .19







Changes in Loan-Value Ratio (percentage points)
.20 .02 .30 .04 .00 .00
.60 .04 1.50 .24 1.60 .04




SOURCE; Data supplied to NBER in a survey of life insurance companies and to ap-
pear in a forthcoming publication.
NOTE: Changes are calculated from three-month averages centered on turning points
in conventional yields (for changes in conventional terms), and in FHA yields (for
changes in FHA and VA terms). Terminal date for the 1960—63 decline is November
1963.Residential Mortgage Yields Since 1951 41
value are in the wrong direction. Values rose considerably faster dur-
ing the three periods of declining yields, 195 1—66, than during the four
periods of rising yields, thus tending to increase cyclical amplitude
rather than dampen it.15
Applying the shift-in-mix hypothesis to shifts in lender and geo-
graphical mix is potentially more promising, since these are the most
important sources of yield variability on a cross-section basis. To test
whether shifts in the geographical and lender mix affected cyclical
yield variability, conventional yields for each turning-point quarter
were recalculated on the assumption that loan distribution among
thirty-six separate strata—four lenders and nine regions— was the same
as in the previous turning-point quarter. The results, shown in Table
2-3, indicate that cyclical changes in lender and geographical mix also
have a negligible effect on over-all cyclical yield variability.
TABLE 2-3.CyclicalChanges in Conventional Mortgage








151 to154(R) 49a .48a
I54toIV54 (D) —.15 —.14
IV 54toI58 (R) .97 .94
I58toIV58(D) —.23 —.19
IV 58toLII60 (R) .65 .65
11160 toIV63(D) —.59 —.60
SOURCE: Same as Table 2-2.
a Contract rate.
The change-in-mix hypothesis implies that FHA mortgage series
should have greater amplitude than conventional series when they are
measured on a comparable basis. Since cross-section yield variability
when value and income are included in the same regression, the latter is much smaller
and frequently not significant. On a time series basis, of course, property value is
affected by changes in price levels as well as by changes in the composition of home
buyers.
itisunlikely in any case that the effect is of any quantitative importance. The re-
lationship between property value and yield for life insurance companies is smaller than
for other lender groups, reflecting the companies' tendency to maintain relatively con-
servative standards.42 Essays on Interest Rates
is lower on FHAs than on conventionals and the mix of FHA yield
determinants has less cyclical sensitivity (see Table 2-2), changes in
mix might be thought to dampen yield variability less in FHAs. In fact,
the amplitude of the FHA authorization series is not significantly dif-
ferent from that of the conventional authorization series (see Table
2-1).
The fourth explanation of the problem is that the relatively narrow
cyclical amplitude of mortgage yields arises from greater differentia-
tion within the mortgage category which causes differences in cyclical
phasing among the various components of the aggregate. (This is illus-
trated in the lower panel of Figure 2-1.) Without any change in mix, the
two components of the total may reach a turning point at different
times, in which case the amplitude of the average will be smaller than
the amplitude of either component. The greater the number of com-
ponent series and the greater the timing differences between them, the
stronger will be this dampening tendency. It is likely that conventional
mortgage loan series are more heterogeneous than bond series, and
thus, in effect, contain more component series with independent
cyclical phasing.
This explanation, however, implies that high-grade bond yield series
will have a wider cyclical amplitude than lower-grade series, since the
former tend to be more homogeneous; similarly, FHA series would be
expected to have a wider amplitude than conventional series. Table 2-1
shows that this is not the case for either bonds or mortgages.
A fifth possible explanation of the relatively narrow amplitude of
conventional mortgage yields is based on cyclical changes in risk pre-
miums. It could be argued that risk premiums between mortgages and
bonds will be smaller at cyclical peaks, which are associated with high
levels of business activity, than they are at troughs. Conventional
mortgages are generally riskier than high-grade bonds and, when eco-
nomic conditions become increasingly favorable, risk premiums nar-
row more on riskier instruments. To put it somewhat differently, the
quality of conventional mortgages improves more than does that of
high-grade bonds during periods of economic expansion.
This hypothesis may be tested indirectly. If a decline in risk pre-
miums accounted for the reduction in yield differentials between con-
ventional mortgages and high-grade bonds during business expansions,
similar reductions should also have occurred as between high-grade
and low-grade bonds, and between FHA and conventional mortgages.
A comparison of yield differentials at business cycle peaks and troughs
does not support this hypothesis, as Table 2-4 shows. The difference inResidential Mortgage Yields Since 1951 43





Yield Differential Peaks TroughsLess Peaks
Conventional mortgage
less Aaa corporate 1.53 1.86 .33
less Aaa state and local 2.42 2.86 .44
Aaa corporate less Baa corporate .71 .83 .12
Aaa state and local less Baa state
and local 1.04 1.01 —.03
Conventional mortgage less FHA
mortgage .05 —.01 —.06
SOURCE: Appendix Table.
theconventional mortgage-high-grade bond yielddifferentialat
reference cycle peaks and troughs was significant at the 1 per cent
level, while the other differences are not significant (in two cases they
have the wrong sign).'6
This test, however, depends heavily upon the assumption that
lender reevaluations of security risk can be tied to reference cycle
turning points. Another test—cruder but perhaps more meaningful in
16AveryCob an's paper on the quality of directly placed bonds points out that changes
in the yield differential are not a perfect proxy for changes in "quality" if quality is de-
fined in terms of the probability that a loan will be repaid. Assume, for example, that the
yield differential between a riskless one-year security and a risky security of the same
maturity reflects only the probability of loss attached to the latter. At the end of the year
the value of the riskiess security will be 1 + Q where G is the contract rate on that
security, while the value of the risk security will be (1 + r)p, where r is the contract rate
on the risk security and p is the probability that the principal and interest will be paid.
Since the risk premium included in r is by hypothesis just large enough to equate the
future value of both securities,I + G =(1+ r)p and p = '.(itcan be shown,
similarly, that if both securities have a maturity of n years,[1±G]n)This means
that if the level of G rises, r must rise by even more to maintain a constant p. The risk
premium expressed in terms of basis points of yield must get larger even though the
probability of loss is constant. The required change in the yield differential, however,
is very small. For example, a cyclical rise in G of the general order of magnitude shown
in the Appendix Table would require a rise of 2—3 basis points in the conventional
mortgage-Aaa bond yield differential in order to maintain a constant risk premium.44 Essays on interest Rates
light of our ignorance on this point —comparesaverage yield differ-
entials during recession periods with averages during expansions.
This test is more favorable to the risk premium hypothesis. As shown
in Table 2-5, the yield differential between Aaa and Baa issues of
TABLE 2-5.YieldDifferential Between Baa and Aaa Bonds
and Between Conventional and FHA Mortgages During





Expansion (E) porateand LocalFHA
(R) Nov. 48—Oct. 49 75 102 8
(E) Nov. 49—June 53 57 85 24
(R) July 53—Aug. 54 62 109 9
(E) Sept. 54—June 56 50 97 10
(R) July 57—April 58 98 108 4
(E) May 58—April 60 75 94 —8
(R) May 60—Feb. 61 79 96 —II
(E) March 61—July 67 57 53 —4
SOURCE: Same as Appendix Table.
corporate and of state and local bonds was higher in each of four
recession periods than in the subsequent expansion. This suggests that
some cyclical reevaluation of risk may well have occurred on bonds.
No such pattern was evident, however, for the yield differential be-
tween conventional and FHA mortgages.
Cyclical changes in mortgage delinquencies are perhaps even more
relevant. One would not expect a recession to raise the ex ante risk
premium on conventional mortgages if the repayment experience on
mortgages held in portfolio was not appreciably affected by the reces-
sion. The evidence on delinquencies, by and large, does not support the
risk premium hypothesis. For major lender groups, including life in-
surance companies, there has been a modest tendency for delin-
quencies to rise during recent recessions, but this appears to be ac-
counted for entirely by FHA and VA mortgages.17 A study of monthly
17Someof the evidence on this is shown in James S. Earley, "The Quantity of Post-
war Credit in the United States," NBER, September 1965(mimeograph).A complete
compendium of delinquency and foreclosure series is listed in Edgar R. Fiedler with the
assistance of Maude R. Pech, "Measures of Credit Quality," NBER, July 1967 (mimeo-
graph).Residential Mortgage Yields Since 1951 45
time series covering conventional mortgages does not reveal any
cyclical sensitivity during the period since 1953, for which monthly
data are available.
The final hypothesis considered here is that the narrow cyclical
amplitude of mortgage yields relative to bond yields reflects differences
in market organization. It can be argued that, for a number of reasons,
rates tend to be relatively sluggish in negotiated markets where bor-
rowers and lenders are in direct contact, as opposed to impersonal
dealer-type markets. First, negotiated markets involve some bilateral
bargaining which will moderate changes in rates if there is any con-
tinuity in the relationship between borrower and lender, as in the case
of commercial banks and their business loan customers, or of life in-
surance companies that acquire mortgages through correspondents.
Concern for maintaining relationships over the long run blunts the
tendency to maximize market position in the short run.
Second, lenders in negotiated markets are likely to have heavy, non-
transferable overhead costs geared to the specific market, as in the
case of life insurance companies that acquire mortgages through their
own network of branch offices. Such lenders find it profitable to main-
tain stable rates in those markets.
Third, lenders in negotiated markets tend to lag in adjusting their
offer functions to yield changes in dealer markets (see below). If basic
credit demands are less stable in the dealer markets, the full range of
rate changes in these markets will not be transmitted to the negotiated
market. Because of the transmission lag, peaks and troughs in the
dealer market are in effect "lopped off." Here, the explanation of why
mortgage yields have smaller cyclical amplitude merges with the ex-
planation given below of why mortgage yields lag bond yields.
Clearly this hypothesis goes beyond our immediate focus into largely
unexplored terrain. It would explain, however, not only the small
amplitude of mortgage yields relative to bond yields, but also the nar-
rower amplitude of commercial bank business loan rates than of rates
on open market paper of comparable maturity.18 It is also of interest
that the FHA secondary market yields series is more volatile than
FHA authorization series though less volatile than bond yields (Table
2-1). The market organization underlying the FHA secondary market
lies somewhere between the organization of the markets underlying
18Forevidence on this, see Phillip Cagan, Changes in the Cyclical Behavior of
Interest Rates, NBER Occasional Paper 100, New York, 1966, p. 9. An alternative
explanation is given by Donald Hodgman, Commercial Bank Loan and In vestment
Policy, Urbana, Ill., 1963, pp. 126—131.46 Essays on Interest Rates
the life insurance company authorization series and that underlying the
bond yield series.19
Lag of Mortgage Yields Relative to Bond Yields at Turning Points
Kiaman noted that "Changes in mortgage interest rates lagged con-
tinually behind changes in bond yields throughout the postwar dec-
ade."2° This lag is reduced by one to six months when transactions are
recorded as of the date of loan authorization rather than the date of
disbursement. The lag is not eliminated, however, as Table 2-6 mdi-
TABLE 2-6. Lag at Turning Points, Conventional Mortgage Yields Relative
to Bond Yields (months)
U.S. Corporate
Govt.
Turning Point in Long Aa
Conventional Yields Term Aaa (New) Baa
(P) Dec. 1949 a 14 13 12
(T)Feb. 1951 14 13 0
(P)Jan. 1954 7 7 8 4
(T) Nov. 1954 4 1 8 —2
(P) Feb. 1958 4 5 3 3
(T)Oct. 1958 6 4 4 3
(P)July 1960 6 6 10 5
(T)Sept. 1965 b 53 30 32 6
1954—60Average 5 5 7 3
SOURCE: Same as Table 2-2, plus Federal Reserve System, Moody's.
aBasedon data for one company.
bBasedon FHLBB series on new housepurchases.
cates.At five turning points during the 1954—60 period, conventional
yields lagged government bond yields by from four to seven months.
These might be considered "normal" lags. Lags at the 1949, 1951 and
1965 turning points were considerably longer, but they were affected
by special developments that changed the underlying relationship be-
'9Thus, there are no dealers in theFHAsecondary market but brokers are often
used, and buyersand sellertend to canvass the market for the best available deal on any
given day.
20 Klaman,p. 78.Residential Mortgage Yields Since 1951 47
tween mortgage and bond yields. The 1965 case will be discussed
below.21
Since the dating of turning points is sometimes unavoidably arbi-
trary, another measure of cyclical sensitivity is employed in Table 2-7.
TABLE2-7. Changes in Yields on Direct Mortgage Loans and on Bonds
Following Turning Points in U.S. Government Bond Yields
No. of
Months
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SOURCE: Same as Table 2-6.
This table uses only one turning point—that on long-term government
bond yields —andmeasures yield changes in all the series during
periods of specified length (e.g., five, ten and fifteen months) beginning
with that date. Relative sensitivity is measured by the rise (or decline)
21Thechanging relationship between mortgage and bond yields during 1949—51 was
discussed in Jack Guttentag's, "Some Studies of the Post-World War II Residential
Construction and Mortgage Markets," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia Uni-
versity, 1958, pp. 82—86.48 Essays on Interest Rates
during the periods following troughs (or peaks) in government bond
yields.22 These comparisons show mortgage yields relatively insensi-
tive at every one of the five turning points in the table. As an example,
ten months after the April 1958 trough in government bond yields,
these bond yields were up 80 basis points, high-grade corporates were
up 50—54 basis points, while direct conventional mortgage yields were
up only I basis point.
One hypothesis used to explain the lag in conventional mortgage
yields suggests that small changes in market demand and supply
register first in changes in loan-value ratios and maturities, and this
retards the adjustment of yields. If this is true, terms will reach a
cyclical turning point before yields. Table 2-8 shows cyclical turning
points in loan-value ratios and maturities corresponding to turning
points in yields (taken from the new NBER series, separately for each
type of loan and for weighted totals covering all loans). Some of these
observations are obscured by the effects of changes in legal limits
while, in other cases, there was no clearly defined turning point in terms.
With these exclusions, there are twenty-two usable observations.
Terms led yields at eight turning points; terms lagged behind in five
cases; in nine cases, the turning points in terms were within one month
of the turning point in yields. If these were independent observations,
an 8—9—5 distribution could easily occur by chance and would provide
little support for the hypothesis that sensitivity of terms retards yield
adjustments.
Since the twenty-two observations are not in fact independent, it is
useful to view this evidence in another way, by taking each of the five
turning points in yield as one observation. From this standpoint, the
evidence provides no support for the hypothesis at all. At only one of
the turning points, the interest rate peak in early 1958, was there a
clear tendency for terms to precede yields; seven of the eight "lead"
observations come from this turning point.23 Terms lagged behind
yields at the other four turning points, although the 1953 turning point
has only one valid observation.
22 comparisonsuse series on direct conventional mortgage loans only, since the
correspondent loan component may have some residual recording lag. The periods fol-
lowing yield peaks are shorter than those following troughs to avoid extending past the
subsequent turning point. The most recent trough is not included in this table because
the trough dates are dispersed over an extraordinary long period in the different series.
23Furthermore,as shown in Table 2-6, the lag of mortgage yields behind bond yields
at this turning point was shorter than usual, whereas the sensitivity-of-terms hypothesis
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The new FHLBB series on conventional loans provide additional
evidence to test the theory that sensitivity in terms retards adjustments
in rates. Although, as yet, these data cover only one turning point,
series are available for five lender groups, separately for new and exist-
ing properties, or ten cases for each loan characteristic. For maturities
there were eight identifiable turning points which lagged the turning
point in their respective contract rate in every case (Table 2-9). Simi-
larly, six identifiable turning points in loan-value ratio all lagged their
respective contract rate. Thus, the data do not support the hypothesis
that sensitivity in terms retards adjustments in yields at cyclical turning
points.
TABLE 2-9. Leads and Lags of Loan-Value Ratios, Maturities, and Fees and
Charges Relative to Contract Rate at the 1965 Contract Rate Trough in Ten






Points in Leads Lags Turning
Characteristic Characteristic Rate Rate Point a
Maturity 8 0 8 0
Loan-value 6 0 6 0
Fees and charges 6 1 4 1
SOURCE: Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
aWithinone month of corresponding rate series.
Neither is the lag in conventional yields explained by a special sensi-
tivity of fees and charges. The NBER conventional contract rate
series has exactly the same turning points as the gross yield series ex-
cept at the 1958 peak when the contract rate series leads by one month.
The FHLBB series show fees lagging rates at the 1965 trough in most
cases (Table 2-9).
Short-term developments affecting general yield levels normally
originate in the bond markets, and this may be an important factor
underlying the tendency of mortgage yields to lag behind bond yields.
The basic demand for mortgage credit is affected mainly by demo-
graphic factors and by "normal" income, changing little in the short
run.24 Demands on the capital markets by the federal government and
24SeeSherman Maisel, "A Theory of Fluctuations in Residential Construction Starts,"
American Economic Review, June 1963, pp. 374—376.Residential Mortgage Yields Since 1951 51
nonfinancial corporations, in contrast, are subject to sharp cyclical
fluctuations.25
Bond yield changes could, of course, be transmitted immediately to
the mortgage market; but, in fact, there is a lag. For a number of
reasons there is virtually no arbitrage between the bond market and
the mortgage market.26 Rate adjustments in the mortgage market de-
pend almost entirely upon the activities of primary lenders. These
lenders appear to be responsive to pervasive changes in bond yields,
though not to short-lived ones. As one lender expressed it, "To attempt
to follow every wiggle in bond yields would unduly disrupt our market
relationships." However, a pervasive movement in bond yields cannot
usually be distinguished from a reversible one until the passage of time
proves it out; the result is that mortgage yields lag. As noted earlier,
this lag, in conjunction with the relatively stable mortgage credit de-
mand, may be partly responsible for the narrow cyclical amplitude of
mortgage yields.
Longer-Run Changes in the Relationship of Conventional Mortgage Yields
to Bond Yields and the 1961 —66 Experience
The relationship between conventional mortgage yields and high-grade
bond yields is examined in two ways. Chart 2-2 shows the yield dif-
ferential (mortgages less long-term government bonds), monthly dur-
ing the period 1948—66. This series is affected by the tendency of
mortgage yields to lag bond yields by periods of varying length. Table
2-10 shows differentials at cyclical peaks and troughs only, with the
yield on each instrument measured at its respective peak or trough.
Thus at peak 4, the yield on conventional mortgages in July 1960 is
compared to the yield on long-term government bonds in January 1960.
These are referred to as "matching differentials."
During the period 1949—60, the monthly series shows marked
SeeJack M. Guttentag, "The Short Cycle In Residential Construction," American
Economic Review, June 1961, pp. 292—294.
2GFirst,because of differentiation within the mortgage market, yield relationships are
not reliable enough to permit effective arbitrage. (Arbitrage transactions must be carried
out in individual securities, and depend on reasonably reliable yield relationships be-
tween the instruments being arbitraged.) Second, the cost of arbitrage transactions in-
volving mortgages is high because the market for outstanding mortgages is rudimentary.
Brokers exist who will attempt to sell mortgages on a commission basis but I do not
know of dealers who will take seasoned mortgages into portfolio. Third, the secondary
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































;54 Essays on Interest Rates
cyclical fluctuations with some indication of widening amplitude, but
there is no indication of trend. Similarly, the matching differentials at
the first three troughs and four peaks show no indication of trend.
During the cyclical decline in yields that began in 1960, however,
mortgage yields continued to fall long past the point at which bond
yields began to drift upward.27 As a result, the 1960—65 decline in the
monthly differential was larger than any earlier cyclical decline (as
measured in basis points from peak to trough), and brought the dif-
ferential some 45—48 basis points below the previous lows reached in
1959 and 1953. Similarly, the matching differential at trough 4 was
markedly lower than at any of the previous troughs. An observer at
the end of 1965 might have speculated, as was done in an early draft of
this paper, that perhaps the yield differential had been "permanently"
reduced.
The dramatic events of 1966— mortgage yields rose more in one year
than they had declined in the previous five —addedan additional dimen-
sion to this experience. The rise in the yield differential during 1966
was larger than during any earlier cyclical rise, and it brought the dif-
ferential back to high levels, although still below earlier peaks. Thus it
appears less certain now than it did at the end of 1965 that a permanent
decline in the differential has occurred. What needs explaining is the
amplitude of the yield differential, greater throughout the period
196 1—66 than in earlier periods, which reflects the increased amplitude
of the mortgage yield series during this period.
The hypothesis offered here to explain the wide amplitude of
mortgage yields during 196 1—66 takes the following crude "facts" as a
point of departure. In the 196 1—65 period of decline in mortgage yields,
net mortgage acquisitions on one- to four-family properties rose to
$72.3 billion from $65.7 billion in the preceding six years, or rose by
$6.6 billion. Commercial banks accounted for most of the increase,
their acquisitions rising by $5.1 billion. During 1966, when mortgage
yields rose precipitously, total net acquisitions dropped $4.6 billion,
all of it accounted for by savings institutions. Commercial bank acquisi-
tions held up in 1966, in contrast to earlier periods of monetary re-
straint when banks tended to desert the mortgage market.
The hypothesis advanced here is that structural changes involving
commercial bank policy toward time deposits, and a marked increase
27Thedispersion of turning points in various yield series at trough 4 is extremely wide,
with several of the series showing multiple bottoms. While timing comparisons at this
turning point are hazardous, the value of matching yield differentials is not significantly
affected by the choice of turning point.Residential Mortgage Yields Since 1951 55
in the relative importance of time depositsthe bank liability mix,
were responsible for the marked variability in mortgage yields during
the 1961—66 period. The shift in the bank liability mix encouraged a
portfolioshift into mortgages which put downward pressure on
mortgage yields during 196 1—65. When tight money emerged in 1966,
commercial banks were able to bid savings accounts away from savings
institutions, which channel most of their funds into mortgages, thus
placing upward pressure on mortgage yields —strongerpressure than in
earlier periods of monetary restraint when banks had raised funds by
liquidating government securities.28
The marginal value of time deposits to commercial banks has grown
steadily over the last decade or so, while their government securities
portfolios have trended downward. Beginning in the late 1950's and
early 1960's, one bank after another found it could no longer rely on
the liquidation of government securities to meet loan demand in excess
of deposit growth. Demand deposit growth, furthermore, had lagged
throughout the entire post-World War II period. As a result, time de-
posits emerged as a valuable source of funds over which banks could
exercise some degree of control.
The shift to time deposits was most pronounced after 1961. In that
year New York City banks began to issue large-denomination nego-
tiable certificates of deposit, and they were followed by large banks in
other cities. Both large and small banks began to compete vigorously
with savings institutions for smaller accounts. Rate differentials be-
tween savings accounts at commercial banks and those at savings insti-
tutions narrowed; rate advertising increased in intensity; and, probably,
elasticity of substitution rose.
Table 2-11 shows three measures of change in bank liability struc-
ture during each of three complete cycles in mortgage yields. Each of
the three measures shows a marked shift toward time deposits in the
196 1—66 cycle, relative to the two earlier cycles. Thus the ratio of time
deposits to total deposits rose by .63 percentage points per quarter
during the 196 1—66 cycle, compared with increases of .27 points and
.26 points in the two preceding cycles.
As their liability mix shifted toward time deposits, the asset pref-
28Anunderlying condition was, of course, the willingness of the Federal Reserve to
allow the commercial banks to compete vigorously for time deposits by keeping Regula-
tion Q ceiling rates above constraint levels. Late in 1966 the System decided that com-
petition for savings had gone so far as to threaten disaster to the residential sector, and
the ceilings on some types of accounts were reduced.56 Essays on Interest Rates
TABLE 2-11. Measures of Change in Bank Liability Structure During Cycles




D0 TO0 DD0 01
(3) (2)
Decline IV 1953—11955 .25 1.27 .52
RiseII 1955—IV1957 .28 1.41 .80
Total Cycle .27 1.36 .70
Decline I1958—1111958 .67 3.20 .73
RiseIV 1958—I1960 .06 .26 .46
Total Cycle .26 1.24 .55
Decline 111960—Ill1965 .68 4,39 .81
RiseIV 1965—IV1966 .41 1.76 .77
Total Cycle .63 3.90 .80




Subscripts 0 and 1 refer to beginning and end of period, respectively. Measures (1)
and (2) show differences per quarter.
erences of commercial banks also changed. It is a tenet
of bank management that mortgages can be prudently acquired with
funds obtained from time deposits.29 Cross-section analysis using
balance sheet data invariably shows a positive correlation between
the relative importance of time deposits on the liability side and
mortgages on the asset side.3° This appears to reflect a combination
of cost and liquidity considerations. If deposit costs are high, bankers
feel they must invest in higher yielding assets.31 In addition, time de-
posits are generally viewed as requiring smaller liquidity provision
than demand deposits, so that asset structure can safely be made less
liquid.
29SeeFred G. Delong, "Liquidity Requirements and Employment of Funds," in Kal-
man J. Cohen and Frederick 5. Hammer (eds.), Analytical Methods in Banking, Home-
wood, III., 1966, pp. 38—53.
30For 416 individual member banks in the Philadelphia Federal Reserve District
on December 31, 1960, the coefficient of correlation between the ratio of time to total
deposits and the ratio of mortgages to total assets was .55.
31Thisimplies profit target behavior by banks rather than profit maximization, which
many economists find difficult to accept.Residential Mortgage Yields Since 1951 57
More direct evidence on this relationship, focusing on changes in
mortgage holdings and changes in time deposits during the period
under study, is provided by the following experiment. The percentage
change in mortgage loans during the period from December 1960
to June 1964 was regressed on various combinations of deposit change
for 416 member banks in the Philadelphia Federal Reserve District.32
To avoid the effects of relationships between changes and levels in
these magnitudes, the initial ratios of mortgages to assets and time
deposits to total deposits (both in December 1960) were also included
as variables in the regressions. As a sort of control, the same pro-
cedure was used to explain the percentage change in state and local
securities, which the banks also acquired in substantial volume dur-
ing this period, except that the equations included the initial ratio
of state and local securities to assets rather than the ratio of mort-
gages to assets. Some results are shown in Table 2-12.
In equation (1), the percentage change in mortgages and in state
and local securities is regressed on the percentage change in time
deposits and the percentage change in total deposits. The regression
coefficient for the change in time deposits is positive and statistically
significant in the mortgage equation, but not in the state and local equa-
tion, suggesting that only mortgage acquisitions were sensitive to the
composition of deposit increase.
Equation (2) used the percentage change in time deposits and those
in demand deposits as separate variables in the regression. In the mort-
gage equation, the coefficient for time deposits was three times as
large as the coefficient for demand deposits, while in the state and local
equation the coefficient for time deposits was not statistically signifi-
cant.33
Since mortgage acquisitions by individual banks were influenced by
changes in their time deposits,34 it can be inferred that mortgage
32am indebted to the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia for these data. Note
that real estate loans in these data cover loans on nonresidential as well as residential
properties.
Equations were also run in which the dependent variable was the change in real
estate loans as a percentage of the initial level of total assets rather than the initial level
of real estate loans. The results were very much the same.
is some reason to believe that the relationship is dominated by small banks.
A study of fifty-three large banks by Morrison and Selden did not reveal any positive
relationship between changes in real estate holdings and changes in time deposits during
1960—63. See George R. Morrison and Richard T. Selden, Time Deposit Growth and
the Employment of BankFunds,Association of Reserve City Bankers, Feb. 1965,
Tables A-i and A-4.58 Essays on Interest Rates
TABLE 2-12. Regression Results Showing Relationship Between Changes in
Real Estate Loans and in State and Local Securities, Held by 416 Member







b-Coef. T R2b-Coef. T R2
Equation (1)
Change in total deposits








Change in time deposits








Change in total deposits







NOTE: Dependent variables are: per cent change in real estate loans in real estate
loan equations, and per cent change in state and local securities in state and local securi-
ties equations. All equations include, in addition to the independent variables listed, the
December 1960 ratio of time deposits to total deposits, size class of bank, and the De-
cember 1960 ratio of real estate loans (or state and local securities) to total assets.
acquisitions by the banking system as a whole were boosted by the
pronounced shift that occurred in the bank deposit mix. This supports
the view that the sharp decline in mortgage yields during the 1961—65
period was due, at least in part, to the marked increase in time deposits
relative to demand deposits during the period, and to a related shift in
bank portfolio preferences for mortgages.
It might appear at first glance that these structural changes affecting
commercial banks would retard the rise in mortgage yields during a
period of monetary restraint, such as emerged in 1966. Presumably
banks would not reduce mortgage acquisitions as sharply as they did
in earlier periods of restraint when mortgages were viewed more as
"residual" assets. Indeed, commercial banks maintained a high level
of mortgage acquisitions in 1966, as Table 2-13 shows.
This view, however, neglects the effect that more intensive bank
competition for time deposits would have on inflows to savings in-
stitutions and on mortgage lending by those institutions. Although theResidential Mortgage Yields Since 1951 59
TABLE 2-13. Changes in Holdings of One- to Four-Family Residential
Mortgages and in Time and Savings Deposits by Commercial Banks and Sav-
ingsInstitutions During Cycles in Mortgage Interest Rates, 1953—66
(amounts in billions of dollars, annual rate)
Time De-
Savings posits as
CommercialBanks Institutions Per Cent
of Total
Time and Time and Time and
Mortgage Interest Savings Mort- Savings Mort- Savings
Rate Cycle Deposits gages Deposits gagesDeposits
Decline IV 53—I55 3.6 1.6 6.7 6.4 35
RiseII 55—TV 57 3.1 0.8 7.1 5.7 30
Decline I58—Ill 58 9.2 1.5 8.8 6.9 51
RiseIV 58—160 1.4 1.1 8.5 7.7 14
Decline II60—111 65 13.7 2.0 13.2 10.0 51
RiseIV 65—TV 66 14.3 2.1 8.4 4.4 63
SouRcE: Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts.
NOTE: Savings institutions are mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations,
and credit unions. Mortgages lead one quarter.
status of mortgages in bank portfolios has risen, they remain less at-
tractive than business loans, the demand for which increased very
sharply in 1966. The banks' determination to meet these demands, in
the face of depleted liquidity positions caused them to bid a sub-
stantial volume of funds away from the savings institutions, which led
to a corresponding reduction in mortgage lending by these institu-
tions.35 As shown in Table 2-13, the maintenance of bank mortgage
lending did not begin to counterbalance the decline in lending by
savings institutions losing funds to banks.36
35The shift in funds became so large in the summer and fall that the Federal Reserve
"took a variety of steps to redress the balance in the flow of funds between business
borrowers and the housing industry. .." (FederalReserve Bulletin, February 1967, p.
189). For a discussion of these measures, see the cited article.
Table 2-13 shows a marked reversal in the pattern of change in savings flows and
mortgage lending in the most recent cycle in mortgage yields, as compared to the two
earlier cycles. In the earlier cycles, the net flow of savings and mortgages at savings
institutions was about as large during the period of rising yields as it was during the
preceding period of falling yields; but in the most recent cycle both flows were markedly
lower during the period of rising yields. The pattern for commercial banks changed in
the opposite way. In earlier cycles, their time deposits and mortgage lending fell during
tight money periods, while in the recent cycle both flows were maintained.60 Essays on Interest Rates
The liquidation of government securities by commercial banks in
earlier periods of restraint had, of course, indirectly affected the flow
of funds into mortgages by changing the yields on alternative invest-
ments. This pressure must have been more diffused and less intense
than the withdrawal of funds from savings institutions, which invest
most of their funds in mortgages. Government securities liquidation in
earlier periods probably was absorbed by reductions in "idle balances,"
whereas the response of lenders such as life insurance companies to
changes in the alternative investment yields probably was much more
gradual than the response of savings institutions to a reduction in their
inflows. A good case can be made that the change in the bank response
to tight money, from an emphasis on reducing investments to an
emphasis on increasing time deposits, has had the result of trans-
mitting the effects of tight money to the mortgage market more
promptly and fully than ever before.
Relationship Between FHA and Conventional Yields
Our new data permit an analysis of changes in the relationship between
FHA and conventional yields over the cycle, and over the eighteen
year period, 1949—66. The dotted line on Chart 2-3 covering 195 1—63
shows the differential based on the new National Bureau series. The
solid line covering the period 1949—66 is based on the FHA secondary
market series, and three linked conventional series.37 Table 2-14 shows
yield differentials calculated at the specific cycle peaks and troughs
in both series. Since the cyclical amplitude of FHA yields is sensitive
to the prepayment assumption, the conventional-FHA yield differential
in this table is computed on four different prepayment assumptions.
It would generally be expected that conventionals would carry higher
yields than FHAs because the latter are virtually free of default risk.
The risk on conventional loans made by life insurance companies, how-
ever, is quite small since these loans typically carry down payments of
25 per cent or more. (Largely for this reason conventional loans by life
insurance companies typically are in the lower range of yields on con-
ventional loans in general.) For some lenders the modest risk ad-
vantage of FHAs is more than counterbalanced by its disadvantages.
3TThe Bureau series is used for 195 1—63, the FHLBB series covering loans by life
insurance companies on new properties for 1964—66, and data on one company for
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TABLE 2-14. Gross Yields on FT-IA and Conventional Mortgages at Specific
Cycle Peaks and Troughs
Part A: Peaks
MarchMarch
FHA Jan. 50 aNov.5358 60Dec. 66
Contract rate 4.50 4.49 5.25 5.75 6.00
Discount (points) —1.57 1.32 2.47 3.45 6.80
Effective yield—8 years 4.25 4.72 5.69 6.37 7.17
10 years 4.28 4.69 5.63 6.28 7.01
Half of maturity 4.28 4.68 5.58 6.20 6.80
Maturity 4.34 4.64 5.52 6.12 6.67
Conventional Dec. 49 aJan.54Feb. 58July 60 Nov. 66
Contract rate 4.59 5.02 5.75 6.12 6.55
Discount (points) —1.27 —.96 —.37 —.13 b
Effective yield—8 years 4.39 4.85 5.68 6.09 6.55
10 years 4.41 4.87 5.69 6.10 6.55
Half of maturity 4.41 4.87 5.69 6.10 6.55
Maturity 4.44 4.90 5.70 6.11 6.55
Conventional less FHA
Effective yield—8 years .14 .13 —.01 —.28 —.62
l0years .13 .18 .06 —.18 —.46
Half of maturity .13 .19 .11 —.10 —.25
Maturity .10 .26 .18 —.01 —.12
Part B: Troughs
FHA Jan. 51Feb. 55 Sept. 58 Aug. 65
Contract rate 4.27 4.50 5.25 5.25
Discount (points) —1.21 .61 1.45 1.40
Effective yield—8 years 4.06 4.60 5.51 5.48
10 years 4.08 4.59 5.47 5.45
Half maturity 4.09 4.58 5.44 5.42
Maturity 4.10 4.57 5.41 5.38
Conventional Feb. 51Nov. 54Oct. 58 Nov. 65
Contract rate 4.48 4.82 5.44 5.50
Discount (points) —1.20 —.83 —.33 b
Effective yield—8 years 4.29 4.66 5.37 5.50
10 years 4.31 4.68 5.38 5.50
Half maturity 4.32 4.68 5.38 5.50
Maturity 4.34 4.70 5.39 5.50
Conventional less FHA
Effective yield—8 years .23 .06 —.14 .02
10 years .23 .09 —.09 .05
Half maturity .23 .10 —.06 .08
Maturity .24 .13 —.02 .12
NOTE: Data are based on NBER authorization series except for the 1966 peak and
1965 trough, which are based on the FHA secondary market series and the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board conventional loan series.
aDatacover one company.
bAssumedequal to zero to maintain comparability.Residential Mortgage Yields Since 1951 63
FHA loans have somewhat higher origination costs because of the
need to comply with the insuring agency's reporting and other require-
ments. Higher delinquency ratios on FHAs raise servicing costs while
higher foreclosure ratios are also viewed unfavorably. While financial
loss on foreclosed FHAs is quite small, most life companies prefer to
avoid foreclosure for public relations and other reasons. In addition,
conventional loans may carry prepayment penalties that are attractive
to lenders, while borrowers can often be offered faster processing, and
the 4-percent insurance premium is avoided. The evidence indicates
that conventionals have usually yielded more, but with some notable
exceptions.
There is some suggestion in Chart 2-3 of a secular decline in the
yield differential over the period 1952—59. Yields declined erratically,
but persistently over this period. A secular decline might be expected
from the favorable repayment experience on conventional mortgages,
which would have reduced their risk premiums relative to federally
underwritten mortgages •38
Theyield differential rose during 1950—52, but for very special
reasons. With FHA 44- per cent mortgages carrying premiums, the
maximum contract rate on these mortgages was reduced toper cent
in April 1950. Since premiums on high contract-rate mortgages are
never large enough to reduce yields to the level of lower contract-rate
mortgages (for reasons discussed in the next section), the reduction in
contract rate also reduced FHA yields and raised the yield differential.
The rise in yield differential during this period can be disregarded,
therefore, as essentially reflecting an administrative action by the
FHA. This strengthens the case for a secular decline.
The data do not reveal any tendency for the yield differential be-
tween FHA and conventional mortgages to change systematically
over the cycle. Thus the average differential at the four peaks and
three troughs covered by the authorization data is about the same, as
shown at the top of page 64. However, Chart 2-3 shows that during two
periods of extreme credit stringency —duringlate 1959—60 and during
1966— the yield differential fell sharply to the point where FHAs were
yielding appreciably more than conventionals. What could account for
this apparent aberration?
The most obvious possibility is that itis a statistical accident,
arising from the lack of statistical comparability between FHA and
38Analternative hypothesis is that the liberalization of terms on conventional mort-
gages during this period kept pace with the increasingly sanguine views of lenders, so
that no reduction in risk premiums occurred.64 Essays on Interest Rates
Conventional Less FHA Yields a
Prepayment 4 Peaks 1950—60 3 Troughs 1951—58
8yearsb —.01% .05%
10 .05 .08
One-half of maturity .08 .09
At maturity .14 .12
aCalculatedfrom Table 2-14. b Afterthe loan is closed.
conventional series. The most convincing evidence that this is not the
case isthat the phenomenon appears in data covering individual
lenders, both in 1959 and in 1966. It also appears in data covering
individual regions and states.
In some degree, the conventional loans acquired during a period of
market tightness are of higher over-all quality than those acquired in
more normal periods, as lenders limit themselves to the best risks.
This might cause a decline in the yield differential but would not ex-
plain why FHAs come to yield more.39
A third possibility, suggested to me by market practitioners, is that
usury laws in some states constrained the rise in yields on conven-
tional loans more than on FHA loans. Discounting had become an
accepted practice on FHAs by 1959, but on conventionals charges
exceeding customary levels encounter borrower resistance and various
kinds of institutional frictions.40
If this explanation was correct, we would expect to find rates on
conventional mortgages rising more slowly, and the margin between
FHA and conventional rates increasing most sharply in states with
relatively low usury ceilings, in states with high or no ceilings, in con-
trast, conventional rates should rise enough so as to maintain a margin
over FHAs. Data available on a state basis forthe 1959—60 period of
market stringency do not support this explanation. Table 2-15 shows
that in the two year period ending in the first quarter of 1960 rates on
conventional loans did not increase any more in three states with a
10 per cent usury ceiling than in three states with a 6 per cent ceiling.
39The decline would be small in any case, since life insurance companies do not
change their risk standards on conventional mortgages very much in the short run.
Manylenders are reluctant to charge discounts on conventional mortgages because
of adverse public relations arising from complaints by borrowers that they had been
forced to pay a usurious charge in disguise. Under the FHA program, only sellers are
allowed by law to pay discounts. Even though this requirement is frequently violated by
adjusting transactions prices, FHA approval provides the lender with aprimafacie valid
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































066 Essays on Interest Rates
FHA yields came to exceed conventional yields in both groups of
states, and in fact the margin was wider in states with high usury ceil-
ings.
Any explanation must begin with the proposition that many in-
dividual lenders have an institutional preference for conventionals
over FHAs at the same rate. Otherwise, barring differences in the
timing of transactions or other statistical quirks, conventionals could
never yield less. Discussions with lenders indicate that some do in-
deed prefer conventionals, for reasons discussed earlier. Under "nor-
mal" market conditions, the impact of lenders with an institutional
preference for conventionals is more than offset by that of lenders
with a preference for FHAs, so that conventionals yield more. Lenders
who prefer FHAs, however, tend to maintain more diversified port-
folios, and are sensitive to rate differentials between mortgages and
bonds. Under conditions of extreme market stringency, such lenders
tend to shift out of FHA mortgages;, these mortgages must then, in
large degree, be absorbed by lenders with a preference for conven-
tionals who will accept them only at premium rates. Unfortunately
there is no way at present to test this hypothesis.
Relationship Between FHA and VA Yields
The relationship between FHA and VA yields is affected by factors
bearing on their relative loan quality, and by their contract rates.
Kiaman noted that VA yields tended to be higher, and prices to be
lower during 1953—56 when their maximum contract rates were the
same.41 He noted that "in general, contract terms—maturities, down
payments, and loan-to-value ratios—have been more liberal for VA
loans than for FHA loans. Lenders generally have regarded VA prop-
erty appraisals also as tending to be more liberal than those made by
FHA. The fact that the VA guarantee is for 60 per cent of a loan (not
to exceed $7500) and FHA insurance for 100 per cent of a loan may
also have influenced investors' judgments about the quality of these
mortgages." 42
Ournew data confirm that VA prices were lower, and discounts
larger, during the 1953—56 period of contract rate equality (Table
41Klaman'scomparisons were based on secondary market price quotations reported
by the Federal National Mortgage Association, described above.
42Klaman,pp. 90—9 1.Residential Mortgage Yields Since 1951 67
Such comparisons are not possible during the next five years
because FHA and VA contract rates differed most of the time, but
during 1962—66 contract rates were again the same. In this later period,
the price differential was negligible. This may reflect the fact that FHA
terms became more liberal during the intervening period relative to
VA terms. By 1964, average down payments were only a few percent-
age points lower on FHA than on VA mortgages, and FHA maturities
were several years longer. It is also possible that lenders became less
concerned with terms during this period.
At various times, FHA mortgages have carried a higher contract
rate than VAs, and this has affected their relative yield. In part, this is
because the yield realized on a mortgage that is not priced at par is
uncertain; it depends not only on the contract rate and the size of the
premium or discount, but also on the life of the mortgage, which is not
known in advance. Most mortgages are prepaid in full well before
maturity. The larger the deviation from par the more important is
variability in life as a determinant of realized yield.44 Lender reaction
to this uncertainty will affect relative yields.
It is quite possible that lender reactions to yield uncertainty will be
different when mortgages sell at premiums than when they sell at dis-
counts from par. When mortgages sell at discounts, yield is a decreas-
ing function of life, and the lowest possible yield, which is realized if
the mortgage runs to maturity, is not much lower than the yield at some
intermediate "expected" life based on past experience or on reason-
able expectations. The maximum yield in this case approaches infinity
as life approaches zero. This is illustrated by the top line in Figure 2-2.
When mortgages carry premiums, on the other hand, yield is an in-
creasing function of life, as illustrated by the lower line on Figure 2-2;
the lowest possible yield approaches minus infinity as life approaches
zero. The maximum yield, which is realized if the mortgage goes to
maturity, is not much higher than the expected yield.
The consequence of miscalculating mortgage life is thus quite dif-
ferent when mortgages sell at premiums than when they sell at dis-
counts. When mortgages carry premiums, an error in the wrong direc-
Prices are used in these comparisons because differences in maturities and expected
life as between FHA and VA mortgages over the period covered were too small to have
any significant effect on yield differences.
SeeJack M. Guttentag, "Mortgage Interest Rates: Trends and Structure," 1964















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Residential Mortgage Yields Since 1951 69
FIGURE 2-2.Yieldon aPer Cent Thirty-Year Mortgage Priced at 95 and
105
tion can be very serious, since yield can be zero or negative. If the
market is heavily influenced by conservative lenders, concerned with
the "worst that can happen," the premium paid on high contract rate
mortgages may not be large enough to equalize yield with low contract
rate mortgages.
When mortgages carry discounts, in contrast, the consequence of a
mistake in estimating mortgage life in the wrong direction is not serious.
Other factors, however, including public relations aspects of accepting
discounts from borrowers, may influence the yield.
The evidence examined here can be divided broadly into two phases,
in both of which, for periods of varying length, the FHA contract rate
was higher than the VA rate. These periods are prior to mid-1952,
when FHAs and VAs carried premiums; and 1957—6 1 when they
carried discounts.
15
Prepayment in years70 Essays on Interest Rates
THE CASE OF PREMIUMS. The data45 confirm the supposition advanced
above that lenders will be reluctant to pay a premium on a high con-
tract rate mortgage large enough to equalize yield with a lower contract
rate mortgage. Prior to April 1950, FHA Section 203 mortgages car-
ried a maximum rate of 43 per cent, while the VA rate was 4 per cent.
One large life insurance company paid an average premium of 0.8
per cent for VAs during this period and 1.6 per cent for FHAs, produc-
ing a yield spread of .37 per cent in favor of the high-rate FHAs (Table
2-17). Put differently, the premium on FHAs would have had to have
been about 4.0 points to equalize the yield with that on VAs. The FHA
rate was only .14 below the conventional rate in this period.
TABLE 2-17. Premiums and Yields on FHA, VA and Conventional Mort-
gages Authorized by Life Insurance Companies, January 1949—April 1950
and January 1951—April 1952
January1949—April 1950 aJanuary1951—April 1952
Contract EffectiveContract Effective
RatePremiumYield RatePremiumYield
FHA 4.49 1.6 4.26 4.26 .5 4.19
VA 4.00 .8 3.89 4.00 —.3 4.04
Conventional 4.58 1.3 4.40 4.63 1.2 4.45
SOURCE: Same as Table 2-2.
aDatalimited to one company.
In April 1950 the FHA rate was reduced to 4* per cent, and the
yield on FHAs immediately fell relative to VAs and conventionals.
Chart 2-3 shows a sharp rise in the yield differential of conventionals
over FHAs following the rate reduction on FFIAs. In the sixteen
months ending April 1952, the FHA yield for life insurance companies
was .07 per cent lower than in the prior period, while the yields on
4 per cent VAs and on conventionals were higher by .15 per cent and
.05 per cent, respectively (see Table 2-17). This shift in the spread
can be attributed largely to the decline in the FHA rate. Neverthe-
less, 4+ per cent FHAs continued to yield more than 4 per cent VAs.46
It may be asked why, under conditions where mortages carry
Publishable data prior to 1951 are limited to one large company. Fragmentary data
from other sources, however, confirm the relationship shown in the table.
46After an adjustment for "quality," the spread would have been wider. It will be
recalled that in 1953—56, when contract rates were the same, VAs yielded more.Residential Mortgage Yields Since 1951 71
premiums, the contract rate was not bid down by competition. The
rate set by law or regulation on FHAs and VAs is, alter all, a maxi-
mum rate and not a minimum. Any extended discussion of this would
go well beyond the scope of this paper, but clearly, the explanation
is rooted in the imperfect character of the residential mortgage market
at the primary (origination) level. Among the relevant factors would
be the following:
(a) The ignorance and unwillingness or inability of most mortgage
borrowers to shop.47
(b) The apparent sanction provided the maximum rate by the fed-
eral agencies; borrowers are encouraged to believe that the govern-
ment has set the rate, rather than merely the maximum rate.
(c) A tendency for mortgage lenders to view rate cutting as an "un-
ethical practice." One large lender who did cut rates below the maxi-
mum in the period when FHAs carried large premiums was taken
severely to task by other lenders.48 The tendency of mortgage lend-
ers was to view the maximum allowable rate much as personal finance
companies view the legal rate ceiling on small loans, namely, as a
customary rate that is in the best interest of all lenders to observe.
(d) The unwillingness of builders to bargain for a lower contract
rate; the builder could usually command part of the premium from the
high-rate mortgage. This might or might not be reflected in lower house
prices.
It would seem an inevitable implication of the above analysis that,
from the standpoint of borrower interest, contract rates on FHA and
VA mortgages should never be high enough that these mortgages
command premiums. As a matter of fact, they never have commanded
premiums since 1953.
THE CASE OF DISCOUNTS. Following the 1953—56 period of contract
rate equality between FHA and VA mortgages, rate differences arose
again beginning in 1957. For this and later periods, price data on
FHAs and VAs are available from FNMA as well as from the new
NBER survey. The latter cover loans authorized by the large life
insurance companies, while the former are largely based on over-the-
counter sales by mortgage companies, mainly to life insurance corn-
For some evidence on this, see Housing and Home Finance Agency, "Residential
Mortgage Financing, Jacksonville, Florida, First Six Months of 1950," Housing Re-
search Paper No. 23, Washington, D.C., December 1952, pp. 30—33.
See H. A. Schaaf, "Federal Interest Rate Policy on Insured and Guaranteed Mort-























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Residential Mortgage Yields Since 1951 73
panies and mutual savings banks. The two sources show only modest
price differences on FHA mortgages, but very substantial differences
on VAs. Thus, during February 1957—July 1957, NBER series show
VAs carrying a discount of 3 points, while the FNMA series show
VAs carrying a discount of 7 points (Table 2-18). As a result, for
the large life insurance companies, the higher contract-rate FHAs
yielded more, while for the lenders covered by the FNMA data the
lower contract-rate VAs yielded more (Table 2-19). The yield dif-
ference was largest during the period October 1957—March 1958,
when the contract rate difference between FHAs and VAs was larg-
est (.75 per cent). During this period, FHAs authorized by the life
companies yielded .62 per cent more than VAs, while on loans sold
by mortgage companies FHAs yielded .23 per cent less than VAs.
When VA mortgages carried lower contract rates than FHAs, the
large life insurance companies reduced their VA volume but took a
limited number at relatively small discounts. This action reflected a
widespread view, in Congress and elsewhere, that large discounts on
VA mortgages were unethical. Kiaman noted that "large financial
intermediaries, in their widely acknowledged role as public trustees,
have been less willing to risk public censure than to ignore the facts
of market forces."Theresult of this policy was, in effect, to create
two markets for VA mortgages: a rationed low-discount market by
large life insurance companies (and perhaps other lenders with simi-
lar compunctions); and a "free" market where discounts rose to the
level necessary to clear the market. It is ironical that the public
pressures on large institutions to limit discounts on VA mortgages,
by causing them to sharply reduce their VA volume, had the effect of
increasing pressure on VA discounts in the "free" market.
There are indications that life insurance company attitudes toward
discounting underwent a considerable change during 1958—59, in the
sense that they began to accept the discounts required to bring VA
yields into an appropriate relationship to FHA yields. Comparing the
October 1957—March 1958andthe September 1958—June 1959
periods, VA discounts rose by 1.7 points in the NBER series and de-
clined by 2.0 points in the FNMA series (Table 2-18). Perhaps even
more dramatic was the shift in the FHA-VA yield relationship in the
NBER series (Table 2-19). Yields on VA mortgages rose by .48 per
cent as VA discounts rose appreciably despite a rise in contract rate
(4.50to4.75 per cent). Yields on FHA mortgages rose by only .02 per
Kiaman,p. 89.74 Essays on Interest Rates











Period (per cent) Period Period c ential d
May 1953—Jan. 1955 FHA 4* 96.2 4.78
(18 observations) a FHA41 b 98.6 4.70 .08
VA 4 94.4 4.80
VA 98.3 4.74 .06
Dec. 1956—June 1957 FHA 41 93.4 5.47
(7 observations) FHA 5 b 5.39 .08
Aug. 1957—Dec. 1958 FHA 5 95.5 5.66
(17 observations) FHA 51b 97.7 5.58 .08
April—Dec. 1958 VA 41 92.1 5.67
(9 observations) VA 94.3 5.59 .08
July—Sept. 1959 VA 4* 91.5 6.02
(3 observations) VA 5+ b 94.8 6.02 .00
Oct. 1959—March 1960 FHA 5+ 93.0 6.30
(6 observations) FHA 96.2 6.31 —.01
Feb.—May 1961 FHA 51b 97.2 5.91
(4 observations) FHA 5* 98.6 5.96 —.05
June 1961—Feb. 1962 FHA S*b 96.3 5.79
(10 observations) FHA 51 97.8 5.82 —.03
FHA 5* 99.4 5.84 —.05
March—April 1966 FHA 5* 92.6 6.37
(2 observations) FHA 51b 94•5 6.33 —.04
May—June 1966 FHA 51 92.6 6.63
(2 observations) FHA 5* b 94.6 6.57 —.06
SOURCE: Federal National Mortgage Association.
aNoobservations for July, September or October 1953.
bCurrentmaximum rate.
cAssumestwenty-five-year maturity, ten-year prepayment.
dLow-ratemortgage less high-rate mortgage.Residential Mortgage Yields Since 1951 75
cent, as discounts on FHA mortgages of constant contract rate in-
creased only slightly.
Evidently by 1961 the market had learned to live with discounts.
During the period April 1961—August 1961, price quotations on VA
loans were about the same in the FNMA series and the NBER series,
and differences between FHA and VA yields were small. However,
the contract rate difference between FHAs and VAs was only .25 per
cent during this period; it is not clear how the market would have
reacted to a .75 per cent difference. Since 1961 contract rates have
been the same.
There is, however, some additional evidence that lenders' attitudes
toward discounting underwent a change during 1959. The evidence
consists of FNMA price quotations following a change in the FHA or
VA maximum contract rate, on old mortgages carrying the old rate.
When the contract rate is changed, new commitments will be at the
new rate, but there will also be some overhang of uncommitted
mortgages carrying the old rate for which mortgage companies or other
originators must find buyers. FNMA continues to report prices on
mortgages carrying the old rate for as long as there is any significant
activity in the older mortgages. During such periods of dual coverage
yield comparisons are possible between old and new mortgages carry-
ing different contract rates (Table 2-20).
These observations reveal that through 1958 yields tended to be
about .08 per cent higher on mortgages carrying the lower contract
rate. In later periods, however, yields were higher on the high contract
rate mortgages. These yield differentials are sensitive to the assumed
maturity and prepayment, but there is no ambiguity regarding the
change in the differentials. No matter what assumptions are made, a
significant decline occurred in the yield on high contract rate mortgages
relative to low contract rate mortgages, indicating a greater willingness
to accept discounts as an offset to a lower contract rate.76 Essays on interest Rates
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NOTE: Mortgage yields are from NBER authorization series, with assumed prepay-
ment of ten years. Bond series are from Moody's.